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Abstract 
Transgressions are a pervasive part of social life. Apologizing is often seen as the morally 
appropriate response to a transgression for perpetrators. Yet, despite the positive effects that 
apologies elicit after situations of conflict, they are not always delivered easily. We argue that 
this is due –at least in part- to perpetrators overestimating the averseness of apologizing, thus 
committing a forecasting error. Across two laboratory experiments and one autobiographical 
recall study, we demonstrate that perpetrators overestimate the averseness they will experience 
when apologizing compared to the averseness they experience when they actually apologize. 
Moreover, we show that this effect is driven by a misconstrual of the effects of an apology. 
Perpetrators overestimate the potentially negative effects of apologizing while simultaneously 
underestimating the potentially positive effects of apologizing. This forecasting error may have a 
negative effect on the initiation of the reconciliation process, due to perpetrators believing that 
apologizing is more averse than it actually is. 
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Forecasting Errors in the Averseness of Apologizing  
 Wherever people work and live in groups, transgressions are bound to happen. Examples 
abound in which people fail to keep their promises, violate each other’s expectations, and make 
decisions that put their own interests before those of others. Transgressions like these often are 
harmful to the interests and well-being of those involved, and when not handled well, can 
escalate into full-blown conflicts and discontinuation of relationships. Transgressions that are not 
handled in a satisfactory way can therefore threaten the cooperative nature of our social and 
organizational lives, and as a result can cause continued stress among those involved. For this 
reason, it is important that conflicting parties reconcile after a transgression. 
One important response that can be demanded from perpetrators in order to restore a 
relationship after a transgression is to deliver an apology. From early on in life, people are 
socialized into taking responsibility for their transgressions by apologizing (Bennett & 
Dewberry, 1994; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). Doing so contributes to the resolution of conflicts 
because by apologizing, perpetrators implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) acknowledge that the 
transgression should not have happened, thereby reaffirming the moral codes of conduct within 
their community and restoring respect to the victim (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Gill, 2000; 
Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991). For these reasons, apologies are the 
expected response to misconduct (Goffman, 1971; Tavuchis, 1991) – to the point that 
apologizing has been characterized as a moral duty of perpetrators (Barkan & Karn, 2006). In 
other words, after having transgressed, apologizing is “the right thing to do” (Tucker, Turner, 
Barling, Reid, & Elving, 2006, p. 205). 
Despite the existence of a moral obligation for perpetrators to apologize, and despite the 
importance of apologies to promote reconciliation, perpetrators often fail to deliver an apology. 
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Failure to apologize is problematic for coping with transgressions, because victims feel strongly 
entitled to apologies in the aftermath of transgressions (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; 
Leunissen et al., 2013). Failure to provide apologies therefore will allow conflicts to escalate 
(Ohbuchi, et al., 1989), and contribute to continuing negative outcomes. Perpetrators’ reluctance 
to apologize is particularly problematic, however, when considering that apologies are often 
effective as a means to resolve conflicts and promote forgiveness and reconciliation (Aquino, 
Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Leunissen, De Cremer, 
Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). For example, 
research in organizational settings suggests that apologizing for injustices promotes more 
favorable impressions and trust in the offender, both among victims and third party observers 
(Basford, Offermann, & Behrend, 2013; Byrne, Barling, & Dupré, 2014; Conlon & Murray, 
2006; Cugueró-Escofet, Fortin, & Canela, 2013; Tucker et al., 2006). In light of these findings, 
the reluctance to apologize by perpetrators seems all the more puzzling and problematic (Lazare, 
2004; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012). How can we understand why 
perpetrators are reluctant to apologize, when evidence suggests that doing so might promote 
forgiveness and prevent further harmful conflicts? 
With the present research, we aim to provide an answer to this question. We suggest that 
perpetrators may overestimate the averseness of apologizing, expecting it to be more averse than 
they actually experience it to be when providing an apology. More specifically, we argue that 
perpetrators may display a forecasting error when considering apologizing, which may limit their 
willingness to apologize – in spite of the effectiveness of apologies as a means to promote 
forgiveness and reconciliation, and perpetrators’ relative satisfaction when actually offering 
them.  
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Understanding perpetrators’ reluctance to apologize 
Why would perpetrators be reluctant to apologize? Recent advances in research on 
apologizing and reconciliation have revealed a number of reasons that explain why perpetrators 
may think negatively about apologizing. One reason may be that in many cases, perpetrators may 
not acknowledge that they have transgressed, or may see their behavior as justified, and therefore 
are unwilling to apologize (Baumeister, 1999; Leunissen et al., 2013). Research on the 
intrapsychological effects of apologizing suggests that refusing to apologize may protect the 
perpetrator’s self-esteem (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). In line with this, research has 
suggested that apologizing may be threatening to perpetrators by undermining their status or 
power position. Perpetrators fear that by apologizing, they surrender power by providing the 
victim with the choice to forgive or not, and fuelling demands for compensation (Leunissen et 
al., 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). This is paralleled by studies conducted in organizational 
settings, which shows that leaders may fear that apologizing makes them look weak and could 
threaten their authority, or may harm their interests by increasing the risk for demands of 
financial compensation (Cohen, 1999; Tucker et al., 2006). In light of such averse potential 
effects of apologizing, it may not be surprising that perpetrators hold negative associations with 
the act of apologizing (Lazare, 2004). 
But are these associations in fact accurate? There is some evidence that suggests they are 
not. Although perpetrators may expect apologizing to have negative implications for them, there 
is research that suggests that perpetrators in fact may display rather favorable reactions after 
having actually apologized. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that perpetrators are 
generally content with the apologies they have offered (Lazare, 2004), and empirical research 
shows that perpetrators feel more regret over the apologies they have not offered than over 
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apologies they have offered, suggesting that perpetrators look back positively at apologies once 
they have offered them (Exline et al., 2007). Moreover, research among leaders in organizational 
settings suggests that apologizing is associated with psychological well-being for perpetrators, 
including emotional health and authentic pride (Byrne et al., 2014). And lastly, as noted, research 
has shown that apologies may effectively promote outcomes that are valuable to perpetrators in 
the aftermath of transgressions, such as more favorable impressions, reconciliation, forgiveness 
and reduction of conflict (e.g., Aquino et al., 2001; Bottom et al., 2002; Leunissen et al., 2013; 
Tucker et al., 2006). In sum, these findings suggest that after having apologized, perpetrators 
may look upon apologies rather favorably. This does not seem to be in line with the negative 
associations that perpetrators have in advance with apologizing. We propose that these 
seemingly contradictory research findings fit the pattern of what is referred to in the social 
psychological literature as an affective forecasting error. 
The affective forecasting literature notes that people are not very good at predicting their 
future affective states (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Specifically, research on affective forecasting 
errors shows that people are usually inaccurate in predicting the affective intensity of future 
events (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000). For instance, people overestimate the 
intensity of regret they will experience when just missing the subway (Gilbert, Morewedge, 
Risen, & Wilson, 2004), and they overestimate the intensity of happiness that they will 
experience when their favorite football team wins (Wilson, et al., 2000). We suggest that the 
differences between people’s expected averseness of apologizing and their experienced 
averseness after having apologized may similarly constitute a forecasting error, such that people 
overpredict the averseness of apologizing. 
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We suggest that the reason for this forecasting error may lie in the way that people 
misconstrue the act of apologizing. Misconstruing the nature of a future event (i.e. imagining an 
event that is qualitatively different from the actually experienced event) is an important source of 
forecasting errors (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). People may similarly misconstrue the act of 
apologizing by overestimating the negative effects of apologizing, while simultaneously 
underestimating the positive effects of apologizing. This prediction follows from research 
showing that the potential for negative effects of behavior cause more distress and has a greater 
influence on representation of that behavior than the potential for positive effects of behavior 
(Baumeister et al., 2001 or Taylor, 1991). With regard to apologizing, these findings thus suggest 
that perpetrators will overestimate the negative effects of apologizing, while simultaneously 
underestimating the positive effects of an apology. As a consequence, when predicting how they 
will experience the act of apologizing, perpetrators may place disproportionate weight on the 
potential negative effects of apologizing – while their actual experience of apologies is likely to 
be characterized by more positive effects, given the generally positive impact of apologies have 
on forgiveness and reconciliation (see Aquino et al., 2001; Bottom et al., 2002; Lazare, 2004; 
Leunissen et al., 2013; Tucker et al., 2006) and on perpetrators’ personal wellbeing (Byrne et al., 
2014; Exline et al., 2007). This results in a forecasting error in which perpetrator overestimate 
the experienced averseness of an apology. 
The present research 
In the present research, we aim to provide more insight into the factors that influence the 
willingness of perpetrators to apologize after transgressions. By doing so, we aim to extend the 
literature on apologies and reconciliation in several ways. Firstly, we provide more insight on the 
psychology of apologizing in perpetrators – a perspective that has received relatively little 
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attention in the literature, which has primarily focused on victims, and especially victims’ 
reactions to apologies (Palanski, 2012; Leunissen et al., 2012). Second, we identify an important 
intrapersonal process in the reconciliation phase, namely their construal of the act of apologizing. 
This forecasting error in turn may limit the willingness of perpetrators to apologize. The limited 
research that has been conducted on the willingness to apologize has focused primarily on 
interpersonal processes that influence the willingness to apologize (e.g. victims’ reactions to a 
transgression, see Leunissen et al., 2012). We suggest that intrapersonal processes may also play 
an important role in people’s decisions to apologize (see also Okimoto et al. 2013). Indeed, as 
forecasting errors have been shown to have an important influence on behavior (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003), and forecasting errors are prevalent when construing distressing situations, such 
as apologizing, forecasting errors could play a pivotal role in the apology process as well (e.g. 
De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011). Finally, the present research may extend the 
literature on reconciliation by identifying a bias that deters perpetrators from apologizing. If 
perpetrators indeed overestimate the averseness of apologizing, then this identifies an important 
intrapersonal obstacle to reconciliation – and thereby may point at novel ways of promoting 
reconciliation, by countering such misperceptions. These reasons illustrate why it is important to 
know whether perpetrators overestimate the averseness of apologizing. 
We tested our hypothesis in both controlled laboratory experiments (which provide high 
internal validity; Studies 1a and 1b) and an autobiographical narrative study (which yields a high 
ecological validity; Study 2). Because a laboratory experiment provides control over the type of 
transgression that is committed, we decided to sacrifice ecological validity for internal validity in 
Study 1a and 1b, and to opt for an experimental methodology first. As the type of transgression 
that perpetrators commit (Leunissen et al., 2013) and the way that victims react to transgressions 
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(Leunissen et al., 2012) both have an effect on the willingness of perpetrators to apologize, a 
method was required that would allow us to test our forecasting hypothesis independently from 
the disrupting impact of these variables. We therefore opted for a paradigm in which we could 
experimentally induce a transgression, allowing us to test our hypothesized forecasting error in a 
highly controlled way. Study 1a provides a first test for our hypothesis in a laboratory setting. In 
line with a recently increased emphasis on replications in experimental research (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), we sought to replicate the findings of Study 1a in Study 1b. In 
Study 1b, we also wanted to rule out a (methodological) alternative explanation for the findings 
in our initial study.  
Subsequently, we complement these findings in Study 2 by testing our hypothesis using 
autobiographical narrative methodology (e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Leunissen 
et al., 2013). This approach allowed us to examine the averseness of actually delivered apologies 
after naturally occurring transgressions, and to compare it with the forecasted averseness of 
apologizing in similar circumstances. Indeed, this multi-method approach, in which we 
replicated the same effect over different types of methodologies, each with its own strengths and 
drawbacks (generalizability, ecological validity, internal validity), provides a stringent test for 
our hypothesis. 
Study 1a 
In this study, we aim to test our hypothesized forecasting effect: the predicted averseness 
of apologizing is higher than the actually experienced averseness when perpetrators apologize. 
To test this forecasting effect, we induced participants to commit an interpersonal transgression. 
We compared responses of participants who were asked to imagine apologizing for the 
transgression with those of participants who were asked to actually apologize.  
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In addition, we also included a third condition in which participants imagined committing 
a transgression and imagined apologizing for the transgression. While the latter condition is not 
of central importance for the present study, its inclusion here is important for interpreting the 
design of Study 2. In the latter study, the recalled averseness of actual apologies for actual 
transgressions will be compared to predicted averseness of imagined apologies for imagined 
transgressions. As such, it is important to investigate whether imagining or actually committing a 
transgression has an independent effect on the predicted averseness of apologizing. 
Method 
Participants & design. A total of 118 undergraduate business students (58 women; Mage 
= 21.4; SDage = 2.7) participated for partial course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions of our forecasting manipulation. Specifically, they were either assigned to an 
imagined transgression & imagined apology condition, a real transgression & imagined apology 
condition, or a real transgression & real apology condition. 
Procedure. The first part of the experiment was designed to induce a transgression. After 
the participants had committed the transgression we introduced our forecasting manipulation and 
finally we assessed the dependent variables. 
Transgression. We used a paradigm developed by SimanTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel 
(2014) to experimentally create a transgression. The study was introduced to participants as a 
study on performance-contingent pay. It was explained that participants could win points in this 
experiment. These points earned participants tickets for a lottery for a 50 Euro gift voucher. 
Participants would play a general knowledge quiz through a computer network, against another 
participant who was ostensibly also in the lab (in reality, the interaction with this ‘other player’ 
was preprogrammed). Before participants played the game, they were asked to divide 60 chips 
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between themselves and the other player (the other player could also divide 60 points). It was 
explained that the 60 chips would be divided in accordance with the proposed division of the 
winner of the quiz. 
 After participants proposed a division of the points, they continued to the knowledge 
quiz. This quiz consisted of 5 multiple choice questions and 5 questions on which participants 
had to estimate the correct answer (e.g. “How many moons does the planet Mars have?”). 
Participants would receive 1 point for each correctly answered multiple-choice question. One 
point for each estimation question was awarded to the player from each quiz dyad who was 
closest to the correct answer on each estimate question. The quiz was rigged by telling 
participants afterwards they were closer to the real answer than their opponent was on the 
estimation questions. As such, we could tell every participant that they were the winner of the 
quiz and that the points would be divided as they had decided at the beginning of the experiment. 
Forecasting manipulation. Participants in the real transgression conditions were told 
that they had divided the points less fairly than the other player and not in accordance with the 
social norms in these kinds of situations. Participants in the real transgression & imagined 
apology condition were asked to imagine apologizing to the other player for this. Participants in 
the real transgression & real apology condition were told that they had to apologize for this to 
the other player. On the next screen, they could type in the apology and send it to the other 
player. The apologies were coded by an independent coder who was uninformed about the 
purpose of this study. Of the 39 participants in the real transgression & real apology condition, 7 
gave responses that were not considered to be apologies by the coder. These 7 participants were 
excluded from the analyses. Participants in the imagined transgression & imagined apology 
condition were asked to imagine they had divided the point unfairly and not in accordance with 
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social norms in these situations, and were asked to imagine apologizing for this. After the 
manipulation, (forecasted) averseness towards apologizing was measured with: How “stressful”, 
hard”, “unpleasant”, “humiliating” it was (would it be) to apologize? (α = .89; all items were 
measured on a 1 = not at all, to 7 = very much scale). Exploratory factor analysis showed that the 
4 items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 3.03, explaining 75.84% of the variance. 
Results 
 Our procedure was aimed at experimentally creating perpetration in the lab by giving 
participants feedback about their division of points. We checked the credibility of this induction 
by checking the actual divisions of chips that participants made: 63.1% of the participants 
decided to keep more chips for themselves than to give to the other player, 34.2% of the 
participants made an equal split between themselves and the other player; 2.7% of the 
participants gave more chips to the other player than they kept for themselves. When controlling 
for the amount of chips kept by the participant in the analysis of our main dependent variable the 
results do not change in a meaningful way. 
An ANOVA with the forecasting manipulation and the amount of points kept by the 
participant as independent variables showed a significant main effect of the forecasting 
manipulation (F(2, 107) = 4.32, p = .02, η2 = .08). The main effect of the amount of chips kept 
by the participant was not significant (F(1, 107) = 1.57, p = .21, η2 = .01). Planned comparisons 
indicated that participants in the real transgression & real apology condition experienced less 
averseness towards apologizing (M = 2.73, SD = 1.54) than participants predicted in the 
imagined transgression & imagined apology condition (M =3.74, SD = 1.47; p = .004) and 
participants in the real transgression & imagined apology condition (M =3.33, SD = 1.55; p = 
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.08). There was no difference in predicted averseness between the imagined transgression & 
imagined apology condition and the real transgression & imagined apology condition (p = .23).  
Discussion 
These results are in line with the hypothesis that perpetrators make a forecasting error 
when predicting how aversive it is to apologize. Perpetrators in both imagined apology 
conditions overestimated the averseness of apologizing compared to the averseness that 
perpetrators experienced in the real apology condition. Perpetrators also overestimated the 
averseness of an apology when imagining both committing a transgression and imagining 
apologizing for it. This shows that the forecasting error does not only emerge when people have 
already committed a transgression but rather that averseness is generally associated with 
apologizing. This finding shows that the predicted averseness of apologizing is not so much 
influenced by whether people have actually committed a transgression or not. 
Study 1b 
Study 1b was conducted to replicate the findings of Study 1a and to address a potential 
limitation of this study. Specifically, in Study 1a, participants received specific instructions about 
how to actually apologize (by typing the apology into the pop-up screen, which would then be 
communicated via the computer network) whereas participants who imagined apologizing did 
not receive such specific instructions. One alternative explanation for the results of Study 1a is 
thus that participants’ imagined apology actually took a more averse form (e.g., having to do it in 
public) than the actual apology. In Study 1b, we therefore asked participants in the imagined 
apology condition to also imagine typing in an apology into the pop-up screen. 
Method 
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Participants & design. A total of 89 undergraduate business students (36 women; Mage = 
21.21; SDage = 2.06) participated for partial course credit.  
Procedure. We used the same procedure as in Study 1, with one exception. This time in 
the forecasting conditions, it was explicitly stated how the apology would be given. More 
precisely, we wrote: Imagine that you were told to apologize for this by means of typing a 
message on the next screen. 
Results 
 As in Study 1a, we checked the credibility of our transgression induction: 78.2% of the 
participants decided to keep more chips for themselves than to give to the other player, 18.4% of 
the participants made an equal split between themselves and the other player; 3.4% of the 
participants gave more chips to the other player than they kept themselves. We control for the 
amount of chips kept by the participant in the analysis of our main dependent variable. Excluding 
the amount of chips kept by the participant as a control variable does not change the reported 
results in a meaningful way. 
An ANOVA with the forecasting manipulation and the amount of chips kept by the 
participant as independent variables showed a main effect of the forecasting manipulation (F(2, 
83) = 2.89, p = .06, η2 = .07). The main effect of the amount of chips kept by the participant was 
not significant (F(1, 83) = .43, p = .51, η2 = .005).  Planned comparisons indicated that 
participants in the real transgression & real apology condition experienced less averseness 
towards apologizing (M = 2.45, SD = 1.07) than participants predicted in the imagined 
transgression & imagined apology condition (M =3.21, SD = 1.33; p = .04) and participants in 
the real transgression & imagined apology condition (M = 3.27, SD = 1.66; p = .03). There was 
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no difference in predicted averseness between the imagined transgression & imagined apology 
condition and the real transgression & imagined apology condition (p = .89). 
Discussion 
Study 1b replicated the results of Study 1a, and addressed a methodological issue of 
Study 1a. Specifically, we ruled out the possibility that our forecasting effect was driven by 
different construals between the forecast and experience conditions of how the apology would be 
delivered. In the forecasting conditions, we explicitly described how the apology would be 
delivered, similar to the real transgression & real apology condition. Nevertheless, the results 
were in line with the hypothesized forecasting error. Moreover, we replicated our finding that the 
forecasted averseness of an apology is not influenced by whether the transgression is imagined or 
actually committed: in both conditions, the forecasted averseness of apologizing was again 
significantly higher than the averseness of an actual apology.  
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to expand upon the findings of Study 1 in a number of ways. First, 
we wanted to test whether the observed forecasting error could be generalized to real-world 
social situations. In Studies 1a and 1b, the interpersonal offense and the apology were situated in 
a (preprogrammed) computer network setting, allowing for strong experimental control. Yet, this 
is a relatively artificial situation. In order to test our hypothesis in an ecologically valid situation, 
we employed an autobiographical narrative methodology, in which we asked participants to 
remember an apology they had given in the context of their daily life (Baumeister, et al., 1990; 
Leunissen et al., 2013). We compared the averseness of a delivered apology to the forecasted 
averseness of an apology under similar circumstances. This design meant that participants had to 
imagine both committing a transgression as well as imagine apologizing for that transgression. 
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This forms a potential confound in our design because both the transgression and the apology are 
imagined (vs. actually experienced). However, studies 1a and 1b offer some confidence in the 
validity of this design. In these studies, we showed that imagining versus actually committing a 
transgression did not have an independent effect on the predicted averseness of apologizing.  
Because we have no control over the transgressions that participant imagine and 
remember, they may remember or imagine transgressions of a fundamentally different nature 
and, as a result, base the averseness of the apology on fundamentally different transgressions. 
For instance, perpetrators may downplay the severity of a remembered transgression (Baumeister 
et al., 1990), relative to an imagined transgression. To exclude the possibility that our forecasting 
effect is driven by fundamentally different transgressions that participants imagine or remember, 
we measured two common dimensions on which transgressions can be categorized: severity and 
intentionality (e.g. Aquino et al., 2006; Desmet & Leunissen, 2014; Leunissen et al., 2013). 
 Second, Study 2 was designed to test our proposed mediating mechanism. As noted in the 
introduction, we believe that the reason that people overestimate the averseness of apologizing is 
because they overestimate the potentially negative effects of apologizing while they 
underestimate the potentially positively effects of apologizing. In order to test whether this 
misconstrual of apologies indeed drives our forecasting effect, we measured the predicted and 
actually experienced positive and negative effects of apologizing in this study. 
Finally, in this study we aimed to improve our dependent measure. In Studies 1a and 1b, 
we showed that people overestimate the averseness of apologizing. However, people have been 
shown to make forecasting errors in both positive and negative domains (e.g. Gilbert, et al., 
2004; Wilson, et al., 2000). As such, to show that people overestimate the averseness of 
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apologizing, and not simply overestimate effects of apologizing in both the positive and negative 
domain, we added 4 positively valenced items to our averseness scale. 
Method 
Participants & design. A total of 164 respondents (62 women; Mage = 32.06; SDage = 
10.76) participated in this study. Respondents were recruited through the online system Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Respondents were randomly assigned to a forecasting or experience 
condition. 
Procedure. This study was introduced as a study on social experiences. In the forecasting 
condition, participants were asked:  In this study, we are interested in social experiences, and 
specifically in negative social experiences. Below, we would like to ask you to imagine a 
situation in which you do something that somebody else experiences as unfair or unjust. Please 
note, we ask you to imagine a situation, so please do not think of a situation that has actually 
happened. 
Participants in the experience condition were asked: In this study, we are interested in 
social experiences, and specifically in negative social experiences. Below, we would like to ask 
you to recall a situation in which you did something that somebody else experienced as unfair or 
unjust. Specifically, we would like you to remember a situation for which you later did apologize. 
Participants in both the forecasting and the experience condition were asked to write down a 
paragraph on the incident. 
Measures. All items were measured on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. Averseness 
of apologizing was measured with the same items as in Study 1a and 1b and 4 additional, 
positively valenced, items: How relieving would it be to apologize?; 2) How easy would it be to 
apologize?; 3) How positive would it be to apologize?; 4) How rewarding would it be to 
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apologize? These four items were recoded, such that a higher score on the total scale indicated a 
stronger averseness of apologizing. The total scale showed a good reliability (α = .83). 
We measured the (anticipated) positive effects of apologizing with 3 items: 1) How likely 
is it that the other will accept the apology?; 2) Do you think an apology will help to restore the 
relationship with the other?; 3) How likely is it that the other will forgive you when you 
apologize? (α = .64). 
We measured the (anticipated) negative effects of apologizing with 3 items: 1) How 
much would you fear the other will reject the apology?; 2) Do you think the other will take 
advantage of you because you apologized?; 3) How negatively will others perceive you after you 
have apologized? (α = .90). 
We measured transgression severity with four items: How 1) unfair, 2) unjust, 3) 
unpleasant and 4) severe is (forecasting condition) / was (experience condition) the situation that 
you just described? (α = .84). Intentionality was measured with a single item: The situation that 
you just described, did you do this accidentally or intentionally? (1 = accidently, 7 = 
intentionally). 
Results 
Averseness. An ANOVA with our forecasting manipulation as the independent variable 
and the averseness scale as the dependent variable indicated a significant effect of our 
forecasting manipulation (F(1,162) = 12.49, p = .001, η2 = .07). As expected, participants in the 
forecasting condition predicted the averseness of apologizing as significantly higher (M =4.20, 
SD = 1.24) than participants in the experience condition experienced the averseness of 
apologizing (M =3.49, SD = 1.31). 
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Positive and negative effects of apologizing. An ANOVA with our forecasting 
manipulation as the independent variable and the positive effects scale as the dependent variable 
indicated a significant effect of our forecasting manipulation (F(1,162) = 57.43, p < .001, η2 = 
.26). As expected, participants in the forecasting condition underestimated the positive effects of 
an apology (M =3.82, SD = 1.43), compared to positive effects of an apology that participants in 
the experience condition experienced (M =5.41, SD = 1.27). 
An ANOVA with our forecasting manipulation as the independent variable and the 
negative effects scale as the dependent variable indicated a significant effect of our forecasting 
manipulation (F(1,162) = 9.44, p = .002, η2 = .06). Participants in the forecasting condition 
overestimated the negative effects of an apology (M =3.39, SD = 1.30), compared to negative 
effects of an apology that participants in the experience condition experienced (M =2.79, SD = 
1.23). 
Mediation analysis. In order to provide further support that the overestimation of 
negative effects and the underestimation of positive effects mediates the forecasting effect on 
averseness, we first regressed the positive effects and negative effects scales (standardized) and 
the forecasting manipulation (effect coded: -1 = forecasting condition, 1 = experience condition) 
on averseness. This indicated a significant effect of the positive effects scale (β = -.36, t(160) = -
4.81, p < .001) and the negative effects scale (β = .42, t(160) = 6.31, p < .001), but not of the 
forecasting manipulation (β = .01, t(160) = .19, p = .85). 
Finally, we directly tested the indirect effects of our forecasting manipulations through 
both the positive effects scale and the negative effects scale on averseness using the PROCESS 
macro developed by Hayes (2013; 5000 bootstrap samples). This analysis indicated that both the 
indirect effect through positive effects (b = -.49, S.E. = .12, 95% CI [-.d74; -.28]), and the 
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indirect effect through the negative effects scale (b = -.26, S.E. = .10, 95% CI [-.48; -.09]) was 
reliably different from 0, suggesting that the predicted positive and negative effects  
Transgression severity and intentionality. We did not find a significant effect of our 
forecasting manipulation on transgression severity (F(1,162) = 2.66, p = .11, η2 = .02), although 
the trend indicated that participants imagined slightly more severe transgressions (M = 5.03, SD 
= 1.28) than they remembered (M = 4.70, SD = 1.26). We did find a significant effect of our 
forecasting manipulation on the intentionality measure (F(1,162) = 12.63, p < .001, η2 = .07). 
Participants imagined more intentional transgressions in the forecasting condition (M = 5.54, SD 
= 1.87) than they remembered in the experience condition (M = 4.41, SD = 2.16). We reran all 
the analyses reported while controlling for transgression severity and intentionality. The results 
did not change in any meaningful way when controlling for these transgression dimensions. 
Discussion 
In Study 2, we replicated our forecasting effect in an ecologically valid setting: using 
naturally occurring apologies after naturally occurring transgressions. This study shows that this 
forecasting error also occurs in everyday interactions. Additionally, it shows that the forecasting 
effect that we find in Study 1a and 1b is not limited to anonymous situations that potentially have 
low identity effects but also emerges in the case of face-to-face apologies that people make (or 
fear to make) in organizational settings. Finally, the forecasting effect was found regardless of 
the severity of the offense, suggesting that the forecasting error is not contingent on 
transgressions of either low or high severity. 
General discussion 
 Interpersonal transgressions are a common occurrence in our lives and an apology has 
been shown to be an appropriate and effective response after such occurrences. In spite of the 
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satisfaction, wellbeing, and reconciliation that perpetrators often experience when they 
apologized, perpetrators often fail to apologize for their misbehavior, ostensibly because 
perpetrators believe it is averse to apologize (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Basford, et al., 2013; 
Byrne et al., 2014; Lazare, 2004; Tucker et al., 2006). In the present research, we sought to 
understand this contradiction between the positive effects of an apology and the averse 
associations that a perpetrator have with apologizing. Based on the affective forecasting 
literature, we predicted that perpetrators might overestimate how averse apologizing is (Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2003). The findings of the present research supported our predictions. In Study 1a and 
1b we showed that perpetrators commit a forecasting error by overestimating the averseness of 
an apology. In Study 2, we extended these controlled laboratory results to apologies in 
meaningful real-world situations. Here, using an autobiographical narrative methodology, we 
showed the same forecasting error using naturally occurring transgressions and apologies.  
Moreover, the findings of Study 2 also show why people make this forecasting error. 
When thinking about apologizing, people overestimate the negative implication of apologizing, 
like whether the victim will take advantage of them after apologizing or how negatively others 
will perceive them after they apologized. Simultaneously, people underestimate the positive 
effects that an apology has on the victim like the likelihood of forgiveness or of a restored 
relationship. Indeed, this misconstrual of the effects of an apology on a victim causes people to 
overestimate the averseness of apologizing.  
These findings raise the question of why people do not learn to associate apologies with 
more positive outcomes, given that apologies are ubiquitous in social life and often have very 
positive effects. We believe that the rarer instances in which apologies do have negative effects 
have a stronger impact on the impressions that people create of apologies. This is in line with 
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research showing that negative events have a stronger impact on representations in memory than 
positive events have (Baumeister et al., 2001), and these biased representations may in turn 
predict a forecasting error (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  
Implications  
The present research sheds a new light on the willingness to apologize after 
transgressions by examining an intrapsychological mechanism that helps to explain why 
perpetrators may often be unwilling to apologize. Specifically, our findings suggest that the 
reconciliation process is hindered because of the way perpetrators misconstrue the act of 
apologizing, thereby overestimating its averseness. That perpetrators make this forecasting error 
is especially relevant because the affective forecasts that people make about their decision 
options often have a pivotal impact on the decisions they eventually make (Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003). Therefore, the decision to apologize likely depends strongly on the way that perpetrators 
construe the act of apologizing itself. Because perpetrators overestimate the averseness of 
apologizing, it is therefore also likely that they will withhold apologies as a result of this 
forecasting error. 
As withholding apologies has negative consequences for the aftermath of transgressions, 
such as increased anger among victims (Cohen, 1999; Ohbuchi et al., 1989), this forecasting 
error may also contribute to conflict escalations. In a powerful example, taken from medical 
practice, Cohen (1999) shows that the delivery of apologies is often hindered by the negative 
expectations that perpetrators have of them, fearing lawsuits and negative reactions from 
patients.  Contrary to these negative expectations, after making apologizing an institutional 
practice following medical mistakes, the number of law suits against the hospital dropped (as did 
the settlement amount when the case was brought to court). Interviews with patients showed they 
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valued an apology greatly after a mistake because it gave them a sense of justice and assurance 
the mistake was unlikely to be committed again, thereby decreasing the desire to sue the hospital. 
Indeed the negative expectations that perpetrators held of apologizing were strongly 
overestimated, while the positive effects were strongly underestimated. Our research sheds a new 
light on these findings by showing that these forecasting errors and miscontrual of the effects of 
an apology are in fact a general phenomenon. This example shows how forecasting errors can 
have a negative effect on the willingness to apologize and do contribute to the escalation of 
conflicts (i.e. lawsuits between patients and the hospital). Staying within the context of legal 
disputes, apologies are an integral part of restorative justice (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, Platow, 
2010; Strang et al, 2006). Indeed, restorative justice conferences in which a victim and 
perpetrator meet has been shown to benefit greatly from an apology (Strang, et al, 2006). 
Mediators of these conferences can benefit from the present results by informing the perpetrator 
about the biased perceptions of apologies they may very well hold. 
Our studies also contribute to a growing understanding of the intrapsychological 
processes and effects that apologies may have for those who deliver them (e.g. Okimoto et al., 
2013). As it is ultimately the perpetrator who decides to apologize or not, knowing more about 
the effects of apologies on perpetrators provides a fruitful avenue to a more complete 
understanding of the reconciliation process and the role that apologies play in this process, in 
addition to interpersonal processes, which have been studied somewhat more extensively (e.g. 
Leunissen et al., 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Future directions  
As the studied forecasting effect is likely to have a negative impact on perpetrators’ 
willingness to apologize, however, future research should investigate whether the forecasts that 
FORECASTING ERRORS IN APOLOGIZING  24 
 
people make about apologies have indeed a negative effect on their willingness to apologize. 
Future research should also investigate how this forecasting effect can be ameliorated. This 
might not be an easy task given people’s preoccupation with negative over positive effects of 
behavior (Baumeister et al., 1991). Because perpetrators overestimate the negative effects that 
apologies have, and underestimate the positive effects that apologies have, removing this bias 
may have a positive effect on perpetrator’s expectations of apologies and thereby their 
willingness to apologize. One of the ways in which the negativity bias can be curbed is to reflect 
on positive instances of a similar event (Baumeister et al., 2001). Because the majority of 
apologies that perpetrators deliver are likely to be met with appreciation by the victim, asking 
perpetrators to reflect on specific apologies they have given and their effects on the victims 
(rather than relying on the abstract representations that they have of apologies), may help to 
temporarily eliminate this bias towards the negative effects of apologizing.  
When thinking of ways to reduce forecasting errors on reconciliation, it is also important to 
note that victims may also play an important role in revising these predictions. Specifically, 
previous research has shown that the victim’s stance after a transgression can have a pivotal 
impact on perpetrators’ decisions to apologize or not, such that more forgiving victims are more 
likely to receive an apology (Leunissen et al., 2012). These findings are important for addressing 
forecasting errors in reconciliation, because they suggest that perpetrators’ pessimistic forecasts 
on apologies may be adjusted if victims adopt a somewhat forgiving (and avoiding an 
unforgiving) stance in the aftermath of conflict or transgressions. This way, reactions of victims 
to a perpetrator may help to remove the obstacles to apologize and reconcile that perpetrators 
create in their construal of those acts. 
Strengths and limitations 
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By using an online environment in a controlled laboratory setting in Study 1, we were able 
to keep the setting in which an apology was offered constant within the real apology condition 
(Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Yet, this controlled setting also implies a limitation 
because participants could not observe any reaction of the victim to their apology. We therefore 
replicated the effect obtained in Study 1a and 1b in a naturalistic setting in Study 2. However, a 
limitation of this naturalistic setting of Study 2 is that participants both imagined a transgression 
and imagined apologizing for it in the forecasting condition while participants in the experience 
condition reflected upon an actually committed transgression and an apology that was given 
afterwards. Although the results of two lab studies showed that the forecasting effect was driven 
by the (imagined) apology and not whether the transgression was imagined or not, this lab setting 
was specific for one type of transgression. Transgressions imagined and actually committed in 
Study 2 could differ on other important dimensions not controlled for in this study, a limitation 
that is not present in studies 1a and 1b. In sum, we aimed to validly answer our research question 
by combining different research methodologies, thereby capitalizing on the high levels of 
experimental control and ecological validity that different research methods yield. 
Conclusion 
Apologies are an important instrument for victim and perpetrator to reconcile and are 
generally seen as the morally appropriate course of action after a transgression. However, 
perpetrators have negative associations with apologizing, therefore may often choose to withhold 
an apology. We believe that our studies challenge these negative perceptions of apologizing and 
bring a more positive message in the sense that perpetrators generally look back rather positively 
on the apologies they have offered. Indeed, making perpetrators more aware of the beneficial 
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effects of apologizing can have a positive effect on conflicts and allows us to fully capitalize on 
the positive effects that apologies have. 
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